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Many different figures have been given for theprecise number of rightists attacked in the 1957Anti-Rightist Campaign. In September 1979,
in its endorsement of the Request for instructions on vari-
ous issues concerning the continuous implementation of
Central Committee Document No. 55 [1978] submitted by
the five central departments, the Central Committee of the
CCP referred to “the more than 550,000 people through-
out the country who were classified as rightists” and went
on to say:
….the numbers of those defined as “centre-rightists”
in the anti-rightist struggle, and of workers and peo-
ple’s police designated anti-socialist elements were
large, as was the number of family members impli-
cated because of rightist problems. The figures in-
clude approximately 160,000 who merely lost their
official posts and had to be re-assigned. Some of
these people, even though not labelled as rightists,
have been punished more severely than the rightists
and have had to contend with very difficult circum-
stances. […] In addition, many rural primary school
teachers and basic-level cadres were also classified as
rightists at that time, and although subsequently the
Central Committee issued an order that the identifi-
cation of rightists in rural primary schools and among
basic-level cadres was not permitted, by then it was
too late, and the labelling had gotten out of hand.
Here, too, those involved were not in a minority. In
these two groups there were overall tens of thousands
of “centre-rightists” who, whether or not they had
been labelled as rightists, were nevertheless punished
in the same way as the rightists, or even more harshly
than the rightists. 
If all these groups of people are added together, the total
cannot be less than one million. In 1991, in his book
Open Conspiracy, Ding Shu wrote: “Investigations have
revealed that the total number of people identified as
rightists during the Anti-Rightist Campaign was 1.3 mil-
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In a recent essay, Chen Ziming makes use of current publications and many first-hand witness accounts to bring a new
perspective to the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957. The first part draws a distinction between “active rightists” (zhudong
youpai) and “passive rightists” (beidong youpai) and further divides the former category into three groups: “right-wing
intellectuals”, “revisionists” and “rights defenders,” analysing the specificities of and differences between these groups.
While the “right-wing intellectuals” consisted of democratic personalities influential prior to 1949, particularly Zhang Bojun
and Luo Longji, who advocated “changing the constitution and the mode of government,” the “revisionists” encompassed
intellectuals within the Party (Li Shenzhi and Liu Binyan) as well as students raised “under the red flag” (Lin Xiling and Tan
Tianrong). Influenced by recent developments within the communist camp, they denounced the personality cult and the
excesses of the system and called for a change of political and ideological line in favour of a “great democracy.” The “rights
defenders” referred to the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to denounce violations of political rights (in
particular during political campaigns), and of individual freedoms, economic and social rights, as well as the absence of
liberty in the scientific, cultural, and artistic spheres (epitomized by the suppression of entire academic fields such as law,
political science, and sociology). The last part of the article highlights the legacy of the movement, and describes how its
ideas have been taken further by various forces campaigning for a democratisation of China. For this issue of China
Perspectives, we have chosen to publish a full translation of the part of Chen Ziming’s essay that deals with the first group of
rightists, the “right-wing intellectuals,” as well as substantial extracts from the last part. Interested readers may refer to the
full Chinese text on the CEFC’s website. (Editor’s note)
CHEN Z IMING
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lion.”((1) In January 2006, a Hong Kong magazine quoted
figures revealed at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo on
3 May 1958, which showed that the total number of people
in all the categories of rightist was more than three mil-
lion.((2)
In June 1980, the Central Committee departments con-
cerned decided that the rightist classification of Zhang
Bojun, Luo Longji, Chu Anping, Peng Wenying, and Chen
Renbing should not be revised. By then, with the possible
exception of Chu Anping, of whom all trace had been lost,
Chen Renbing was the only one of the five still alive. To
friends, Chen referred to himself as “the only surviving gen-
uine rightist.”((3) How many “genuine rightists” there were
among the 550,000 or 1,300,000 or 3,000,000 is a very in-
teresting question. Judged by the definition given in Mao
Zedong’s Things are About to Change (“rightists, who are
anti-Communist”), the number of “genuine rightists” was
tiny. Even Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, the leaders of
what was known at the time as the “Zhang-Luo alliance,”
never opposed communism or had the courage or determi-
nation to try to overthrow the Communist Party. If, however,
we were to judge them according to the “Six Criteria”((4)
added when Mao revised his On the Correct Handling of
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1. Ding Shu, Yang mou: “Fan you” qian hou (Open Conspiracy: Before and after the “Anti-
rightist campaign”), Hong Kong, Jiushi niandai zazhi she, 1991 (Editor’s note).
2. Muren: “Just how many rightists were targeted in 1957?”, on the Xin Shiji (New Cen-
tury) website.
3. Xu Youwei, “Tuo mian zi gan: Chen Renbing de wannian” (Swallowing the insults: The
final years of Chen Renbing), Bainian chao (Hundred years tide), Beijing, 2003, No. 8.
4. The Six Criteria were “1) [Words and deeds] should help to unite, and not divide, the
people of all our nationalities; 2) [They] should be beneficial, and not harmful, to social-
ist transformation and socialist construction; 3) [They] should help to consolidate, and
not undermine or weaken, the people’s democratic dictatorship; 4) [They] should help
to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism; 5) [They] should
help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party;
6) [They] should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the
unity of the peace-loving people of the world.” “On the Correct Handling of Contradic-
tions Among the People,” in Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], Vol. 5
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977), p. 393.
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Chen Ziming
The author of this essay, Chen Ziming, is an important personality in the Chinese democratic movement. Born in 1953, Chen
underwent re-education through labour in 1975 for having criticised Mao. After his release in April 1976, he played a major role
in the April 5th Movement directed against the leftist line. He was imprisoned when the movement was repressed, and after his
release in 1978, he participated in the creation of the journal Beijing zhi chun (Beijing Spring), the most moderate of the Democ-
racy Wall movement publications. Having entered the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, he was elected a People’s Congress
representative for Haidian District in 1980. In the mid-1980s, together with Wang Juntao, he initiated a university by correspon-
dence, and the Beijing Research Centre on Economy and Society, an independent organization seen as a symbol of Chinese civil
society in the 1980s. Wang and Chen also bought up the Jingjixue zhoubao, which became a major mouthpiece of the demo-
cratic movement in the run-up to 1989. Initially doubtful about the student demonstrations, Chen joined the movement after the
proclamation of martial law, and was instrumental, with Wang Juntao, in creating the Union of people from all circles in the cap-
ital. Branded as the “black hands” behind the Tiananmen protests, both were sentenced to 13 years in prison in 1991. After he
was freed, Chen Ziming, who unlike Wang Juntao served out his entire sentence and chose to remain in China, created a web-
site that was subsequently shut down by the authorities. In 2007, he was allowed to visit Hong Kong to carry out research; the
text translated below was first presented as a lecture at the University Service Centre of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
Despite the hardships he has endured, Chen Ziming continues to dedicate himself to advancing the cause of China’s democrati-
sation. This is probably one of the reasons why he is interested in the various episodes in which the democratic movement has
manifested itself in China since the foundation of the People’s Republic. Like many of his companions in the fight for democracy,
he believes that the absence of a structured memory of the movement is one of its weak points in China today. This essay is an
example of Chen’s attempt to remedy this situation by analysing the ideas and writings of dissenting intellectuals of the 1950s and
showing that they remain very relevant: “Fifty years have passed, and the ideas bequeathed to us by the different types of ‘active
rightist’ of 1957 still inspire us; their spirit of exploration and their courageous resistance still encourage us to fight till our last
breath for the democratisation of China.”
Jean-Philippe Béja
Contradictions Among the People, the number of “genuine
rightists” could rise substantially, because the interpretation
of these criteria was much more flexible.
This article will not adopt the classification of “genuine
rightists” versus “false rightists,” because the two were so in-
termingled that it would be hard to differentiate “genuine”
from ”false”; rather, it will make use of the distinction be-
tween “active rightists” and “passive rightists,” because it is
easier to distinguish between those who took to the stage
and performed voluntarily and those who had to be forced
to participate. […]“Right ist  intel lectuals”
In Things are About to Change, written on 15 May 1957,
Mao Zedong divided “rightists” into two types: “right-wing
intellectuals in society” (shehui shang de youyi zhishi fenzi)
and “rightists in the Communist Party – revisionists”
(gongchandang de youpai – xiuzheng zhuyizhe).((5) By intel-
lectuals “in society,” he meant the intellectuals in all sectors
of society who belonged to the democratic parties or who
lacked any party affiliation. In this section, I intend first to
analyse what was meant by “right-wing intellectuals in soci-
ety,” and in the following section I will discuss what Mao
meant by the term “revisionists.”
Those whom Mao dubbed “right-wing intellectuals,” repre-
sented principally by people such as Zhang Bojun and Luo
Longji, were in actual fact largely centre-left intellectuals; ten
years earlier, this was how Mao, too, had looked on them.
In the mid- to late 1940s, these left-wing intellectuals had be-
longed to the Communist Party (CCP), and embraced
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; right-wing
intellectuals belonged to the Guomindang (GMD) and were
disciples of the official ideology, the Three People’s Princi-
ples of the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen, which had by then
metamorphosed into the traditionalist authoritarianism
under the leader of the party and the country, Chiang Kai-
shek. Between the Communists and the GMD was the
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5. Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 5, p. 424.
Propaganda poster from the Anti-rightist Campaign, calling to “Fiercely
attack rightists, give the assault ruthlessly, preserve the achievements of
socialism.”
© IISH Stefan R. Landsberger Collection, http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger.
“third party” (di san fangmian) or “intermediate force”
(zhongjian shili). Those intellectuals who belonged to the
“intermediate force” were divided into centre-leftists and
centre-rightists. The former were social democrats such as
Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, while the latter were liberals
such as Hu Shi and Fu Sinian. After 1949, right-wing intel-
lectuals and centre-right intellectuals either fled (to Taiwan,
Hong Kong or elsewhere overseas), were suppressed (by
“extermination, imprisonment or surveillance”; sha, guan,
guan殺關管), or went into hiding (they were well aware of
the nature of the Communist Party, and would not readily
become involved in “open conspiracy”). Now that the polit-
ical spectrum had, as it were, ruptured in the middle, the for-
mer centre-left intellectuals became, in Mao’s eyes, the new
“right-wing intellectuals” in spite of the fact that neither their
ideological viewpoint nor their political stand had materially
changed.((6) There were, of course, some less well-known in-
tellectuals on the right wing who did stand to the right of the
political spectrum in the ordinary sense. 
In the Anti-Rightist Campaign, one major “label” that
“right-wing intellectuals” such as the “Zhang-Luo alliance”
had to bear was that of “anti-communist,” the specific accu-
sation being that they were demanding to “take turns being
in charge” (lunliu zuozhuang 輪流坐莊)((7) and trying to
“replace [the Party]” (qu er dai zhi取而代之).((8) In fact,
every one of the accusations levelled against them was a fab-
rication.
The most important proof of their alleged anti-communism
was that the People’s University lecturer Ge Peiqi wanted to
“kill communists.” On 27 May, Renda Zhoubao (People’s
University weekly), the internal magazine of the People’s
University, published a speech Ge had made three days ear-
lier, which contained passages such as the following: “It is
good that Party members should have a masterful attitude,
but it is not permissible for you to believe that ‘we are the
state.’ […] If you do a good job, that is fine; if you do not,
the masses can bring you down and kill communists; if they
overthrow you, this cannot be said to be unpatriotic; it is be-
cause the communists are not serving the people.” That af-
ternoon, Ge Peiqi went to see Nie Zhen, the deputy secre-
tary of the People’s University Party Committee and vice-
chancellor of the university, and requested some corrections,
because the remark as quoted above differed from what he
had originally said. However, not only did the Renda
Zhoubao fail to alter the text, but the comment as published
in the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) four days later was
taken further out of context and deliberately distorted.((9)
Even when distorted like this, Ge’s remark was a hypotheti-
cal one – if the Communist Party failed to serve the people,
it could be overthrown. Mao said something similar in 1957,
and the Chinese communist leaders often reiterated it after-
wards. However, this was a case where, as in the proverb,
“The local officials are allowed to light a fire, while the com-
mon people are not allowed to light a lantern.” The reason
why Ge Peiqi’s speech was made with more confidence
than speeches by other rightists was that he had once been
an underground party worker for the Communists and an in-
telligence agent who made a great contribution to their
cause. 
The phrase “taking turns to be in charge” was said to be
Zhang Bojun’s idea of politics. But in 1980, the Central
Committee’s United Front Work Department admitted in a
talk with Zhang’s wife and daughter that “The material used
to designate Mr Zhang as a rightist at that time was inaccu-
rate, and none of it, from his idea of Political Design Insti-
tutes to his opposition to script reform, held water. But the
expression ‘taking turns to be in charge’ had already been
used by Cheng Qian to criticise rightists, and it was ex-
tended to cover Mr Zhang as well.”((10) “Taking turns to be
in charge” means taking turns to hold power, which would
mean parliamentary politics, clear separation between the
6. More precisely, after 1949 the thinking of centre-left intellectuals initially moved to the
left, but then shifted back towards the right after the “Three Antis” and the “Five Antis”
campaigns, agricultural co- operativisation, and the campaign to eliminate counter-rev-
olutionaries, although it did not return to its original position. For example, in October
1948, Luo Longji, in the name of the Central Committee of the Democratic League,
which stayed in Shanghai, “wrote a letter containing a series of proposals to the Com-
munist Party, of which the gist was: 1) At home, they should implement a parliamentary
system of government; 2) Abroad, they should adopt a policy of ‘harmonious diplomacy’
(i.e., they should have an equally friendly attitude to the United States and the Soviet
Union); 3) The Democratic League should be free to be a legal opposition party; 4) Com-
munist Party members within the League should make known their identity, to avoid
overlap between Communists and League members.” Quoted from Zhu Zheng, “Fan
youpai douzheng shi liuchan de wenhua da geming (The Anti-Rightist struggle was an
abortive Cultural Revolution),” in Hua Xia wenzhai zengkan, No. 528. The so-called
“rightist” views that Luo expressed in 1957 were nowhere near reaching this stage.
7. Li Weihan, when recollecting this period in later years, wrote, “In the middle of May,
when for the third or fourth time some bad things were published in the [Wen]huibao,
absurd ideas like ‘taking turns to be in charge’ and ‘Hyde Park’ were emerging.” (Li Wei-
han, in the final volume of Huiyi yu yanjiu (Recollections and research), (Beijing: Zhong-
gong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986, pp. 833-834).)
8. Mao Zedong claimed that “It is the Zhang-Luo alliance […] who summon the storm and
churn the waves, plot in secret and incite discontent among the masses, make contacts
high and low and seek responses far and near; it is only they whose estimate of the cur-
rent situation is that utter confusion
everywhere will lead to their take-over and whose ultimate aim is to complete their
grand scheme by gradual steps.” (“Wenhuibao de zichanjieji fangxiang yingdang pipan
(The bourgeois orientation of the Wenhuibao must be criticised),” in Mao Zedong xuanji
(Selected works of Mao Zedong). Vol. 5, p. 435).
9. Renmin ribao, 31 May 1957.
10. Zhang Yihe, “Yue shi qiqu yue danping – huiyi wo de fuqin Zhang Bojun (The more un-
even it is, the smoother it becomes – remembering my father, Zhang Bojun)” on the
Zhongguo qingshaonian xin shiji dushuwang website. 
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ruling party and the opposition parties, competitive elec-
tions, and deciding who should hold power on the basis of
a popular ballot. Such a desire may indeed have existed in
the hearts of the leaders of the “rightist intellectuals,” but
they had never expressed it during the rectification cam-
paign. When Zhang had recommended having Political De-
sign Institutes (zhengzhi sheji yuan 政治設計院), he
clearly stated: “This is not the parliamentary politics of cap-
italist states.”((11) At that time, the “right-wing intellectuals in
society” never had any “wild ambition” to “replace [the
Party]”: their goals were coalition government, order and au-
thority, participatory decision-making, and, at best, to have
parties “on an equal footing” (fen ting kang li).
When the government was established in 1949, both the
Communists and the democratic parties signed the Com-
mon Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference (CPPCC), acknowledging that the new
regime was a coalition government that “included represen-
tatives of the working class, the peasants, the revolutionary
army, the intellectuals, the petit bourgeoisie, the national
bourgeoisie, the national minorities, overseas Chinese, and
other patriotic and democratic elements.” At the height of
the rectification campaign, Chu Anping said:
At this point, I’d like to give an example, and ask
Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou for their advice.
Before liberation, we heard Chairman Mao call for
the organisation of a coalition government with those
from outside the Party. When our nation was
founded in 1949, three of the six vice-chairmen of the
Central People’s Government were from outside the
Party, two of the four vice-premiers were from out-
side the Party, and the government truly did look like
a coalition government. But since then the govern-
ment has been re-organised, so that there is now only
11. Zhang Bojun, “Guanyu chengli ‘Zhengzhi Shejiyuan’ de fayan (Speech on setting up ‘Po-
litical Design Institutes’),” Renmin ribao, 22 May 1957.
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Poster calling to “Root out and publicly expose 
the counter-revolutionary revisionists.”
one vice-chairman of the PRC [outside the Party],
and the posts of the original non-Party vice-chairmen
of the Central People’s Government have been
moved to the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress [NPC]. That aside, of the 12
vice-premiers currently on the State Council, not a
single one is a non-Party person – is this because
there is nobody among the non-Party people fit to
hold such a post, and no one who could be trained to
take on such a task? Perhaps this arrangement [a
coalition government] could be looked into again,
bearing in mind both the desire to unite with people
from outside the Party, and to unite the whole nation,
and also the impression this conveys, both at home
and abroad.((12)
His meaning was clear – he was hoping that the country
would return to a situation where it had “coalition govern-
ment.” 
It was Mao Zedong who first broached the matter of promi-
nent persons from the democratic parties holding posts but
having no power. At the first Forum for Democratic Person-
ages held by the Central United Front Work Department,
Zhang Bojun, then Minister of Communications, pointed
out that “where non-Party people are in leadership posi-
tions, it is in reality the leading Party groups that make all
the decisions, and that is the basic reason that non-Party
people have positions but no power.”((13) Luo Longji, also a
Minister at the time, commented that within the Ministry of
Forestry he had both a position and power, but with eight
offices of the State Council above the Ministry, plus the
State Planning Commission and the National Economic
Commission, and various departments of the Party Central
Committee, the Ministry had no power at all.((14) It was later
revealed that as soon as Luo took up his post, he had said,
“In the administrative units, it is administration, and not the
Party, that is in command, and the Party must be subordi-
nate to administration.[….] From now on, discuss everything
with me first.” But his attempt to intervene in the work of
the cadres’ office in this way was rebuffed, and from then on
he “lacked sufficient enthusiasm” for his work as Minister
and gave up trying to give orders.((15)
Zhang Bojun commented: 
In meetings of the State Council, for example, they
often produce something that has already been pre-
pared, and ask us for our opinions: we could do with
fewer such formalist meetings. But if it were possible
to ask questions, produce material, and talk it over
properly, if there were many things to discuss and
everyone could develop their own ideas, nobody
would feel there were too many meetings. […] If,
when we first started work, we had listened more to
the views of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the
CPPCC, and the democratic parties, we would have
taken fewer wrong turnings. If all aspects of issues
such as the anti-illiteracy campaign, or the five-year
cycle of primary education or the popularisation of the
two-wheeled double-shared plough had been dis-
cussed by the ministries of the State Council first, in
the light of the material available, or if they had been
discussed by the democratic parties, senior intellectu-
als, and experts, not as much damage would have
been done. If we go ahead with things when they have
been decided solely within the Party, it will not be
possible to achieve the goals desired. Last year, for ex-
ample, only local Party committee secretaries and a
minority of non-Party senior cadres were tasked with
discussing problems within the system, and the divi-
sion of powers between the centre and the local areas.
Discussion within the Party was seen as the most im-
portant thing. Yet we ought to avail ourselves of the
People’s Political Consultative Conference, the vari-
ous NPC Committees, and the democratic parties
when discussing such matters, because they all have
appropriate knowledge and experience. The same ap-
plies to script reform, which I believe is neither a state
secret nor a question of class struggle, but a question
of internal contradictions within the people, and yet it
has been discussed only by a few enthusiasts.((16)
Zhang made no mention of any of the more important state
matters, such as the nation-wide promotion of agricultural
co-operativisation and the launching of the campaign to elim-
inate counter-revolutionaries (sufan yundong 肅反運動),
12. Chu Anping, “Xiang Mao zhuxi he Zhou zongli ti xie yijian (Some suggestions for Chair-
man Mao and Premier Zhou),” Renmin ribao, 2 June 1957.
13. Zhu Zheng, 1957 nian de xiatian: cong baijia zhengming dao liangjia zhengming (The
summer of 1957: from a hundred schools contending to two families contending),
(Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1998, p. 63).
14. Luo Longji, “Guanyu chengli ‘Pingfan weiyuanhui’ de fayan (Speech on the setting up of
‘Committees to redress wrongs’),” Renmin ribao, 23 May 1957.
15. Yao Shaner, Zai lishi de xuanwo zhong - Zhongguo bai ming da youpai (In the whirlwind
of history – China’s hundred major rightists ),” (Beijing: Chaohua chubanshe, 1993), p.
70, p. 64.
16. Zhang Bojun, “Guanyu chengli ‘zhengzhi shejiyuan’ de fayan (Speech on the establish-
ment of ‘Political Design Institutes’).” 
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where the decision process had steered well clear of “the
Standing Committee of the NPC, the CPPCC, and the
democratic parties.”
Luo Longji believed that, in the light of the fact that the
“Three Antis” (sanfan) and “Five Antis” (wufan) cam-
paigns and the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries
(sufan) had been carried out by leaders of the Communist
Party, when it came to “rehabilitation” (pingfan), major fig-
ures from the democratic parties and non-party personages,
as well as members of the leading party, should be allowed
to participate, in order to demonstrate the success of these
campaigns, and show that they would help anyone with a
grievance to solve their problems. He suggested that “a com-
mission should be set up by the People’s Congress and com-
mittees of the CPPCC, not only to investigate the achieve-
ments in the past of the Three Antis and Five Antis cam-
paigns and the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionar-
ies, but also to publicly encourage all of those who have a
grievance to lodge their complaints. The commission would
be made up of members of the leading party and the demo-
cratic parties, and a cross-section of people from all walks of
life.” He advocated that local people’s congresses and polit-
ical consultative conferences should also set up similar com-
missions, to form a system of them.((17) Because the figures
from the democratic parties and non-party figures had al-
ready been reduced to political flower-vases in the NPC and
the CPPCC system, Luo was hoping that the setting up of
a new system with real political functions would enable them
to take part in the decision process. He called for “the
CPPCC, the NPC, the democratic parties, and the mass
organisations to be the four Design Institutes of politics,” but
he wanted them to play a purely advisory role. “Some items
of basic construction in politics should be given over to them
for discussion first, for ‘three cobblers with their wits com-
bined equal Zhu Geliang, the master mind’. […] From now
on, when the Standing Committee of the NPC and the
CPPCC discuss an issue, every ministry on the Committee
should send a minister to the meeting to represent it and ex-
plain its policy on that issue.”((18) He hoped that these “Po-
litical Design Institutes” would lead to a better understand-
ing of the situation, to the exchange of views, and the mak-
ing of suggestions, but he dared not hope that they would
have the right to make political decisions or veto them,
which was why he said this idea was not a question of “the
parliamentary politics of a capitalist state.” Wang Zaoshi’s
view of reform of the CPPCC was even further from mod-
ern parliamentary politics. He said: “The imperial censorate
(yushi 御史) system in ancient China meant that the cen-
sors had the right to impeach officials independently and
publicly, and historically this right played an important role.
Perhaps we can consider expanding the monitoring role of
the CPPCC, which already exists, into something similar to
the power to impeach of the imperial censors. This would
not only have the effect of mutual supervision in a practical
and obvious way, it would also foster and carry on the fine
tradition of scholars of integrity that China has had through-
out her history.”((19)
In his “Preliminary confession”((20) of 15 July 1957, Luo
Longji acknowledged that “if the democratic parties were to
expand their organisation and increase their strength, they
would be on an equal footing (fen ting kang li 分庭抗禮)
with the leading party.” According to the Xiandai Hanyu
Cidian [Modern Chinese dictionary], the expression fen
ting kang li refers originally to a host and guest standing on
opposite sides of the courtyard and bowing to each other,
but is used these days as a metaphor for treating one another
as equals. In a speech on 10 May, Luo had said, “Before we
can have long-term co-existence of the democratic parties
and the Communist Party, the question of the long-term ex-
istence of the democratic parties needs to be resolved. [ …]
The Communist Party grew up among the masses of the
workers and peasants, but the democratic parties could not
develop among the workers and peasants, and grew up prin-
cipally among the old intellectuals, many of whom are in
their thirties and forties, or older. This contradiction should
be resolved as quickly as possible, otherwise co-existence
will be extremely difficult.” Prior to this, at a meeting of the
Democratic League, Zhang Bojun had suggested setting
membership targets for the democratic parties: “If the par-
ties together increased their membership to one or two mil-
lion, this would certainly mean a change in our policy of con-
centrating on the upper echelons and giving prominence to
the cities […] and for long-term co-existence, youth member-
ship definitely needs to be greatly expanded.”((21) At that
time, the Communist Party already had 12 million members,
so even if the democratic parties had expanded their mem-
bership to one or two million this would still only have been a
tiny fraction of the number of Communists. One can hardly
17. Wang Zaoshi, written speech at the Fourth Meeting of the First People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference in Shanghai on 5 May 1957. 
18. Zhang Bojun, op. cit., Note 10.
19. Wang Zaoshi, op. cit., Note 16.
20. Zai Xieyong (ed), Luo Longji: wode bei bu de jingguo yu fan’gan (Luo Longji: my experi-
ence of being arrested and the disgust it caused in me), (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian
chubanshe, 1999), p. 311.
21. Yao Shaner, op. cit., Note 14, p. 343.
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speak of “hosts and guests bowing to one another” if there are
no longer any “guests.” Pan Dakui, the chairman of the
Sichuan committee of the Democratic League, went a step
further in his interpretation of the expression, and proposed
the three slogans “political freedom (zhengzhi ziyou),” “or-
ganisational autonomy (zuzhi duli),” and “standing up and sit-
ting down as equals (pingqi pingzuo).” Shen Zhiyuan, chair-
man of the Shanghai committee of the Democratic League,
agreed with Pan’s slogans and believed that “from now on the
relationship between the Party and the democratic parties will
not be that of leader and led, for the democratic parties
should be independent. Henceforth they should not follow
the United Front Work Department in everything they do, but
should manage their own affairs.”((22) To be quite honest,
whether we are discussing Zhang and Luo or Pan and Shen,
the focus of attention for all of them was the survival and
growth of the democratic parties and the development of their
vitality and effectiveness -- they never got as far as considering
“taking turns to be in charge ” or “replacing [the Party].”
Since “right-wing intellectuals in society” never constituted a
real threat to the ruling position of the Communists either
subjectively or objectively, why was it that Mao Zedong
adopted the attitude that they should be “killed with one
blow,” even saying “forget about conscience” and “we must
not be soft-hearted”?((23) Because he was unable to accept a
government administration that was affected by the checks
and balances of society, because he wanted the Communist
Party to have “centralised leadership” and “absolute dicta-
torship,” and he wanted “Party Secretaries to take the lead”
and “more personality cults” so that he could push through
a series of radical policies without obstruction. 
Mao Zedong described himself as “a monk under an um-
brella, with no hair and no heaven,”((24) but what the “right-
wing intellectuals” wanted was for him to “strengthen the
rule of law” and “tighten up legislation.” Wang Zaoshi, for
instance, asserted: 
The rule of law has to be strengthened if we are to
extend democracy […] Having experienced several
millennia of feudal despotism, China has always re-
garded the rule of man (renzhi) as more important
than the rule of law (fazhi), and so, although it is now
eight years since the Liberation, there still remain
many feudal vestiges of this in the thinking and living
habits of all of us. Therefore we need to pay particu-
lar attention to propaganda and teaching about the
democratic rule of law. […] According to the Consti-
tution, we have extensive democratic rights, but we
have not yet enacted legislation to implement them
fully. For example there are more than 20 occur-
rences in the Constitution of phrases such as “accord-
ing to the law,” “based on the law,” “subject to the
law,” and “the safeguards of the law,” but almost no
relevant laws have been formulated….What is legal?
What is illegal? What is a crime? What are the lim-
its within which there is freedom and beyond which
there is not? How should trials be run, and how
should punishment be administered? There are many
areas that still suffer from a lack of explicit regula-
tions. While enjoying their freedom, the people still
do not have an adequate sense of security. 
Huang Shaohong said, “Our legislation has fallen behind
the objective situation: criminal law, civil law, laws regarding
the violation of police regulations, and disciplinary law for
public servants have still not been drawn up and published;
the rules and regulations concerning economics are even fur-
ther from completion; the Five-Year Plan is almost at an
end, but regulations concerning weights and measures have
still not been drawn up. People say ‘Why should we worry?
In the Soviet Union this law or that law was drawn up very
late in the day.’ […] But to talk like this is nothing but a de-
fence of bureaucracy and dogmatism.” Huang Shouli be-
lieved that the tardiness of legislation was linked to some of
the dominant ideas of the Centre. First, “the Centre thinks
that even without law it is possible to handle matters in ac-
cordance with policy.” Second, “the Centre is afraid that if
laws are promulgated too early their hands will be tied. But
in fact it is essential to use the law to tie the hands of the
cadres and prevent them from breaking the law and riding
roughshod over discipline. If there were laws, their arbitrary
behaviour could be limited. Therefore, for the Centre to fear
that laws would tie their hands is itself to run counter to le-
gality.”((25) In Mao’s eyes, law was a tool in class struggle and
could be used to tie the hands of others, but there was no
way he would allow it to “tie his own hands.”
22. Yao Shaner, ibid., p. 488, p. 340.
23. Zhou Yuanchuan, “Cong Deng Xiaoping de fanyou baogao shuoqi (With regard to Deng
Xiaoping’s report on anti-rightism),” on Xin Shiji website.
24. This is a pun on “hair/law” in Chinese, meaning he was the kind of person who held
nothing sacred. Edgar Snow famously misunderstood the pun, as underlined by Simon
Leys in Broken Images (Editor’s note).
25. “1957 nian fanyou shiqi de ‘Zhengfajie youpai fenzi miulun huiji’ (The ‘Collected falla-
cies of the rightist elements in political and legal circles’ of the 1957 anti-Rightist pe-
riod), on the “Legal history academic network” (Falü shixue muwang) website; Wang Za-
oshi, as in Notes 16 and 18.
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In 1956, after the Twentieth Party Congress in the Soviet
Union, the international communist movement launched
widespread criticism of “personality cults,” and the Eighth
Congress of the CCP removed from the party constitution
all references to Mao Zedong Thought. In such an environ-
ment, both national and international, Mao sensed that his
power within the Party was diminishing; party and govern-
ment bureaucrats already formed a special stratum with in-
terests of its own to consider, and they were no longer so
biddable when Mao waved his conductor’s baton. Mao
wanted to exploit his prestige among the masses and his
strength “in society” to “correct” those people inside the
Party who believed that they were always right. This was the
background to the “rectification campaign.” Contrary to
Mao’s expectations, what he called his “popularity among
the people” had to a great extent been created by the prop-
aganda machine that he controlled. Within two weeks of the
launch of the “rectification campaign” [Editor’s note: the
early stages of the Anti-Rightist Campaign], he began to
feel that dissatisfaction within society would be even more
dangerous than the lack of absolute obedience inside the
Party, so he urgently changed tack, and adopted the strategy
of “killing the chicken to show the monkey.” By ruthlessly at-
tacking the “Zhang-Luo alliance” and the “right-wing intel-
lectuals” he himself had invented, he intimidated and threat-
ened any potential opponents within the Party. This new
strategy can be said to have basically achieved the desired
results.
During the rectification campaign, Zhang Xiruo criticised
four kinds of bias: one, the craving for greatness and success;
two, ambitiousness for quick success and instant benefits;
three, contempt for the past, and four, blind faith in the fu-
ture. These points described certain things that he had come
across, and were in no way directed particularly at Mao.((26)
Chen Mingshu, however, in a personal letter to Mao, did ad-
monish Mao directly. His description was more pointed than
that of Zhang Xiruo. He listed “a craving for greatness and
success, capriciousness, partiality, and contempt for the
past.” He criticised Mao’s personality as “too hot-headed
and not reasonable enough, too impatient and not measured
enough, too hasty and not calm enough; [he] observes but
does not pay attention” [….] and said that this “affects the
way in which he observes other people and listens to what
they say, and brings with it a lack of balance in his policy-
making and a loss of awareness of the relative importance of
the policy measures he adopts”; […] “sometimes, carried
away by delight or fury, he casts aspersions on the self-re-
spect and status of high-level cadres”; […] “sometimes he is
too ready to believe false reports from cadres and accept
their dogmatic analytical methods, and he makes overly im-
petuous decisions without having looked seriously and in de-
tail at the matter in question.” Mao was furious with Chen
for this criticism, and at the Fourteenth Supreme State
Council on 1 January 1958, he counter-attacked, declaring:
“We cannot avoid ‘partiality,’ but our bias cannot be towards
the rightists, it must be towards socialism. To say that gen-
tlemen (junzi) can mix with others without being partisan is
not true – when Confucius had Shaozheng Mao killed, he
was being partisan.”((27) Just imagine, if Mao Zedong had
been lenient with his ‘Shaozheng Mao’ and given people
like Chen Mingshu room to speak when he was forcing
through his three “Red Flag campaigns” (the general line
for socialist construction, the Great Leap Forward, and the
people’s communes), there would never have been that total
silence in society, and in the Party only “General Peng [De-
huai]” and a handful of others “drumming and shouting” on
behalf of the people at the Lushan conference. The direct
consequence of sacrificing the political lives of over a million
rightists was the loss of tens of millions of lives to famine. 
The young Luo Longji was a liberal, as is proved by a series
of articles he wrote in the magazine Xin Yue (Crescent). In
the 1930s, he was involved in setting up the National Social-
ist party, and later worked as the head of propaganda for the
Democratic League, gradually becoming a social democrat.
26. Zhu Zheng, op. cit., Note 12, pp. 73-74.
27. The words of Chen Mingshu and Mao Zedong are quoted from Zhang Lifan, “Chen Ming-
shu shang shu (Chen Mingshu sends in a memorial),” in Suibi, Guangzhou, 2007, No. 1.
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Propaganda poster to commemorate Mao Zedong’s speech
“On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
People,” given in February 1957 and which encouraged
many intellectuals to carry out “loyal” criticism of the
government, thus exposing them to persecution. 
© IISH Stefan R. Landsberger Collection, http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger
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In his later years, Luo probably turned again to liberalism,
because in 1962 he was proud that in the latest edition of
the Encyclopedia Britannica he and Zhang Bojun were de-
scribed as having been attacked as rightists for “calling for
democracy.” Zhang declared publicly in 1957 that he did
not advocate “the parliamentary politics of capitalist states,”
but four years later he told his daughter Zhang Yihe, “What
[Luo Longji] admired about the three-branch system in the
West was its separation of powers, and the bicameral system
I was talking about was actually also a separation of powers.
It does not matter whether there are two, three or four parts.
To sum up, the concentration of powers is not feasible in the
present world. […] The beautiful ideals of communism as
designed by Mao will never be anything but a blue-print, a
fantasy.”((28) It was totally understandable that after experi-
encing the unprecedented agonies of the human catastrophe
of the three Red Flag campaigns, centre-leftists should turn
towards the centre right, towards liberalism. There has been
a similar transformation in the thinking of the generation of
Chinese intellectuals that came after Zhang and Luo, and
that experienced the Cultural Revolution and being sent to
work in the countryside.Carrying  the movementforward and taking  i t  further  
[Editor’s note: After introducing the two other types
of “active rightist” – the “revisionists” within the
Party and the “rights defenders” — in the last section
of his essay Chen Ziming sets about demonstrating
the close links that exist between the 1957 movement
in all its diversity and the forces for democratisation
that are currently at work in China.] 
I pointed out not long ago that there are many different
forces giving impetus to China’s democratisation, and among
them are three that are particularly important. The first is
the democracy movement, in the narrow sense of the
phrase, outside the system; the second is the “rights defence
movement” (weiquan yundong) both within the system and
outside it; the third is the democratising forces within the
system. The democracy movement in the narrow sense has
presented its political demands clearly and publicly: it wishes
a totalitarian dictatorship to be replaced by a democratic sys-
tem and constitutional government. The demands of the
“rights defence” movement directly involve human rights,
the interests of the group, and the rights and interests of the
individual. Since the Communist Party claims that it repre-
sents the interests of all the people, it allows nobody else to
share the responsibility or the glory of “rights defence,” so if
the “rights defence” movement were to step forward more
boldly, it would have a head-on confrontation with those in
power. By acting as it does, however, and gaining concrete
results in one case after another, it is in fact gradually under-
mining the centralised control methods of the Communist
Party. The forces of democratisation within the system en-
gage only in vague political expressions, but there are certain
people who, while hiding their light under a bushel, are se-
cretly contributing in all manner of ways to democratisation,
and accumulating resources for the breakthrough of democ-
ratisation when it occurs. Therefore, all three forces can be
said to belong to the “democratic movement” (minyun) in
the wider sense.((29) It is not hard for us to see that the seeds
of the multiple forces of democratisation at work in China
today are to be found among the “active rightists” of 1957.  
The “rightist intellectuals,” of whom Zhang Bojun and Luo
Longji were the principal representatives, had been the only
remnants on the mainland of the democratic forces for con-
stitutional government in China in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. But by 1957, it was clear that the cutting edge
of their ideas had been blunted, and their political backbone
was suffering from a severe calcium deficiency. The founda-
tions on which their theories were based – law, politics,
sociology, and so on – had been completely suppressed, and
their political organisations – the various democratic parties
– had been reduced to puppets in the hands of the Commu-
nists: their operating expenses were met by the United Front
Work Department, and key posts were allocated solely to
double agents who were underground Communist Party
members. Prior to the Anti-Rightist Campaign, high-ranking
officials within the system, such as Zhang and Luo, had
been gradually assimilated by the Communists, and this was
reflected in their words and actions. It was only after Zhang
and Luo were attacked as leading rightists, stripped of their
ministerial posts, and relegated to positions outside the sys-
tem, that their thoughts once again turned towards the con-
cept of constitutional democracy.
Before 1947 and after 1957, it might be possible to look on
the ideas of Zhang and Luo as home-grown resources for
democracy in China, but the intervening decade was a
trough in the evolution of their thinking. Looked at from
28. Zhang Yihe, “Yi pian qing shan liao ci shen – Luo Longji sumiao (This life ends in an ex-
panse of blue hills -- a portrait of Luo Longji),” on the “Tian yi wang” website.
29. Chen Ziming, “Tuidong minzhuhua de duoyuan liliang (The multiple forces giving impe-
tus to democratisation),” on the “Minzhu Zhongguo” website.
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today’s standpoint, their demand that the democratic parties
should be “on an equal footing” with the Communist Party
was not nearly enough: it is “taking turns to be in charge”
and “replacing the Party” that are the true essence of con-
stitutional democracy. Hu Shi pointed out that:
...if the evolution of liberalism over the past two hun-
dred years has another special and unprecedented po-
litical significance, it is that it permits opposition par-
ties and guarantees minorities the right to freedom. In
the political struggles of the past, whether the east
wind prevailed over the west wind, or the west wind
over the east, those on the losing side had a very hard
time of it; but democratic politics in the West in the
modern age has gradually nurtured a tolerance and an
ethos that allows people to have different ideas. Be-
cause political power is granted by a majority of the
people, when the party in power loses the support of
that majority, it becomes an opposition party, and
those in power have to prepare to step down and live
life out in the cold – and each of the minority parties
then has the possibility of gradually becoming the ma-
jority party. […] Peaceful reform has two meanings:
firstly, the peaceful transfer of power, and secondly,
the carrying out of concrete reforms one step at a
time, using legal methods and seeking to make
progress little by little.((30)
Is there an opposition party? Can there be a peaceful
transfer of power between the ruling party and the opposi-
tion party? These issues are the touchstone of a modern
democratic system of government. If today’s “democratic
parties” are content just to be “parties that participate in
government (i.e., to be “political appendages” and “politi-
cal window-dressing” of the Communists), then China still
needs opposition parties in the true sense (i.e., opposition
parties that can come into power through competitive elec-
tions).
There were discussions and activities among the “active
rightists” of 1957 with a view to establishing opposition par-
ties and “taking turns to be in charge.” A Tianjin high-school
teacher, Huang Xinping, said, “Why can we not have a sys-
tem that allows each party to take turns being in power? If
we did not ask only the Communist Party to rule, but asked
it and all the other parties and factions to put forward differ-
ent political programmes and let the people decide freely,
this would be a stimulus to the Communist Party and the
democratic parties alike, and they would have no option but
to work hard to overcome their weaknesses, to win the votes
of the people, and to serve the people.” […]
Before the breakthrough that brings the transition to democ-
racy, in the final analysis very few warriors will be willing to
throw themselves into the “democratic movement” in the
narrow sense and directly oppose totalitarian despotism; but
there might well be many more people from all walks of life
who will take part in rights defence activities. During the pe-
riod of Mao Zedong’s “absolute dictatorship,” rights de-
fence activities were regarded as “anti-Party and anti-social-
ist” and were ruthlessly  suppressed – the dreadful experi-
ences of the rights defenders among the “active rightists”
mentioned above is evidence of this. But in our current post-
totalitarian society, rights defence activities have acquired a
certain degree of legality, and may already have managed to
bring about some partial improvements. The incidents of the
“eight banned books” and the “Chongqing nailhouse” are
recent examples.((31) In such circumstances, the rational thing
to do is to separate the “democracy movement” in the nar-
row sense from rights defence activities and not to bundle
them up together.[…] Chen Yongmiao has pointed out that
“since the Cultural Revolution, two legal revolutions have
occurred – one is the rights defence movement, the other
the legal investigations of violations of the constitution. The
rights defence movement is a sort of controlled revolution
moving towards constitutional government. When true legit-
imacy conflicts with legality, we must not just carelessly
throw out the constitution. The appropriate thing to do
would be to interpret the constitution, to find in it a basis in
law for opposition and resistance.”((32)
Although the democratising forces within the system are not
without their own Sun Wukong [Translator’s note: The char-
acter Monkey, from the early novel Journey to the West],
who wormed his way into the stomach of the princess with
the iron fan – i.e., they do include revolutionaries who could
burst out from inside the Communist Party and split it asun-
der – most of them are still, as it were, Tang monks whose
hearts are filled with compassion: revisionists who are evolv-
ing peacefully from within, who are remoulding the Commu-
30. Hu Shi, “Liberalism,” in Ouyang Zhesheng (ed.), Hu Shi wenji (Collected works of Hu
Shi),” Vol. 12 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1998), pp. 808-809.
31. Eight books pertaining to sensitive subjects, particularly history, were “banned” in vari-
ous ways in January 2007; one of them is Past Stories of Beijing Opera Stars by Zhang
Yihe, Zhang Bojun’s daughter. The “Chongqing nailhouse” refers to a couple who resis-
ted developers trying to demolish their neighbourhood in Chongqing; their house was fi-
nally torn down in April 2007 (Editor’s note). 
32. Chen Yongmiao, “Yi baoshouzhuyi de fangshi fadong he hezhi geming (Launching and
containing revolution using conservative methods),” Ren yu renquan, April, 2007.
N o  2 0 0 7 / 4 49
The “Active Rightists” of 1957 and Their Legacy
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
N o  2 0 0 7 / 450
nist Party by casting off the old and putting on the new and
who have “put down their cleavers to become Buddha.” The
revisionists among the “active rightists” of 1957 were mostly
adherents of Khrushchev-Titoism, that is, of revisionism
within the frame of Leninism and Stalinism. Although
Khrushchev-Titoism proposed the “three peacefuls and the
two entires” (san he liang quan; “peaceful co-existence,”
“peaceful competition,” “peaceful transition”; “a state of the
entire people” and “a party of the entire people”), and also
“self-government of the working-class” and “material motiva-
tion” […], it never went any further than Deng Xiaoping’s
“Four Basic Principles” and Chen Yun’s “bird-cage”
planned economy. The revisionists currently within the sys-
tem have already progressed (or, one might equally say, re-
gressed) to the stage of Bernstein-Kautskyism, that is, revi-
sionist Marxism. Looked at from the perspective of the his-
tory of the international communist movement, this may be
a backwards step in the political line, but from the perspec-
tive of the history of ideas in China it is intellectually a step
forward. 
[…]
Actually, the revisionists within the system could take an-
other step forward, and abandon their arguments with the
“revisionists of the left” as to which of them are “orthodox
Marxists.” [...] Tony Blair, the leader of the British Labour
Party, has gone further along the road of “moral socialism.”
He frequently refers to the concept of socialism as “social-
ism,” which he defines as follows: “it is not a socialist theory
of classes, trade unions, or capitalism, but a doctrine to get
things done and work together.”((33) He says that his “Third
Way represents a modern socialism, which devotes itself
whole-heartedly to pursuing its goals of social justice and
centre-left politics, but does so using flexible, creative, and
far-sighted methods. It is founded on the concept of values
that have enabled politics to progress over more than a cen-
tury – democracy, liberty, justice, mutual responsibility, and
internationalism. But it is a third way, because it resolutely
bypasses both the old left wing, with its concentration on
state control, high taxation, and the interests of the produc-
ers, and the new right wing, which demonises and would
like to suppress public investment and, often, ‘social’ and col-
lective activities.”((34) One might describe Blair’s “social-ism”
as a revision of “socialism,” but a contemporary one. The
Chinese Communists will only have the opportunity to play
a new political role on the stage of constitutional politics in
the future if they have a party that has evolved towards the
“socialist-labour” type found in developed nations.
Fifty years have passed, and the ideas bequeathed to us by
the different types of “active rightist” of 1957 still inspire us;
their spirit of exploration and their courageous resistance
still encourage us to fight till our last breath for the democ-
ratisation of China. •
• Translated by Caroline Mason
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33. Wang Xuedong et al., “Di san tiao lu yu shehui minzhu zhuyi de zhuanxing” (The Third
Way and the transition to social-democracy), Beijing, Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi
(Contemporary World and Socialism), no. 3, 2000.
34. See Chen Lin et al. (eds.), Di san tiao daolu: shiji zhi jiao de xifang zhengzhi biange (The
third way: changes in Western politics at the turn of the century ),” (Beijing : Dangdaijie
chubanshe, 2000), p.5.
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